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This paper analyzes the welfare impact of a cap on commissions paid by product
providers to intermediaries who advise consumers. In contrast to the extant litera-
ture, with a downward sloping demand capped commissions have a direct impact on
product providers’ margins and consumers’ prices. I show that a general ban is not
welfare optimal as higher commissions do not necessarily lead to higher consumer
prices. Starting from a general ban, allowing (marginally) higher commissions leads
to lower prices as positive commissions make intermediaries wary to recommend more
expensive products to consumers, thus making demand more elastic with respect to
price.
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In many industries consumers are uninformed about the suitability of available products
and thus rely on information intermediaries for advice. Such industries include brokers
for insurance and financial products, physicians who advise on treatments or drugs, and
comparison platforms which provide consumers with a ranking of products. In these mar-
kets, it is common practice that consumers do not pay directly for advice, but rather that
intermediaries receive compensation from product providers in the form of commissions,
gifts or discounts among others.1 In the presence of such compensation structures interme-
diaries are tempted to recommend a more profitable in favor of a more suitable product.
This behavior is called “steering” and may lead to distorted advice.2
This issue is compounded by the fact that consumers have generally high trust in
intermediaries or for other reasons do not anticipate this behavior. In a report to the
European Commission, Chater et al. (2010) conduct an online survey of 6,000 consumers
from eight EU Member states and find that the majority of consumers either trust advice
completely or mostly, and they do not view the advisor as biased.3
1See Cummins and Doherty (2006) for a study on the role and the shape of compensation structures
for intermediation in the commercial insurance industry.
2Several studies find that intermediaries recommend more profitable (for intermediaries) and sometimes
inferior products in the presence of commissions. In the industry of mutual funds, Bergstresser et al. (2008)
and Zhao (2003) find that broker-sold mutual funds underperform direct-sold funds (before costs). For
the life-insurance industry Anagol et al. (2017) conduct field experiments in India and find that advisors
recommend the products with the highest commissions even when they are strictly dominated. In the area
of specialist health-care services Shafrin (2010) analyzes the effect of different compensation structures on
surgery rates and finds that surgeries performed by specialist physicians increase by eighty percent when
they are paid on a per-procedure basis.
3Many other studies echo these findings such as Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007, 2014) who
find that small investors are naive and take stock recommendations at face value while security analysts
deliberately steer these naive investors. Bergstresser and Beshears (2010) find that in the years prior to
the financial crisis, adjustable-rate mortgages were sold more often to consumers who were less suspicious
or had low financial knowledge and thus struggled to understand the features of this type of mortgage. In
an audit study, Mullainathan et al. (2012) find that intermediaries fail to debias their clients and in many
cases reinforce biases when they serve their interests such as return-chasing behavior.
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Taken together, the intermediaries’ incentive to steer and consumers’ naivety or lack
of awareness of the conflict of interest potentially lead to unsatisfactory market outcomes.
Usually, the focus of regulation lies on the effect on the quality of advice (bias). How-
ever, there is also another aspect to be considered, namely the effect of regulation on
consumer welfare through product prices.In this study I focus on this second aspect and
answer the following questions: (i) How does steering affect the product providers’ pricing
decision? (ii) How does a cap on commissions affect pricing and, (iii) What is the optimal
level of such a regulation from a consumer and overall welfare standard?
In order to answer these questions, I extend the framework in Inderst and Ottaviani
(2012a) with heterogeneous consumers. This, crucially, allows me to analyze the interplay
between prices and commissions. I consider a model with two firms that sell horizontally
differentiated goods and a single information intermediary who receives commissions from
these firms for each recommended purchase consumers make. The intermediary has noisy
private information about the suitability of a particular product for the consumer, while a
consumer has an overall valuation vis-à-vis his outside option as his private information.
Thus, the intermediary has to take into account the probability of a purchase conditional
on a recommendation. Furthermore, the intermediary has to trade-off the commission he
receives for a recommendation with the expected cost when he missells. I then analyze
the interaction of commissions and prices in steering advice. This interaction arises due
to the heterogeneity of consumers, which introduces a downward sloping demand to the
model.
Downward sloping demand represents a key departure from the literature and allows
for the aforementioned interaction. Thus, when the intermediary recommends a more ex-
pensive product, he risks with a higher probability that the consumer does not purchase at
all after a recommendation. It is through this channel, that a firm’s demand becomes more
elastic to changes in the price when commissions are positive. Judged by this effect alone,
positive commissions can thus make firms more wary to raise prices and may ultimately
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lead to lower prices. This effect must however be weighted up against a more immediate,
direct effect, namely that higher commissions reduce product providers’ margins and thus
induce them to increase prices.
I find that in equilibrium, when consumers hold naive beliefs and commissions are
not regulated, there is no pass-on of commissions to consumers and firms alone bear the
additional marginal costs represented by commissions.
When turning to regulation, the lack of pass-on of commissions means that increasing
the intermediary’s liability or concern for good advice does not affect prices, but only the
distribution of profits. However, when firms are symmetric and commissions are regulated
through a cap, prices are affected by commissions. And, while the trade-off between a
higher price elasticity and a smaller margin is generally ambiguous, I still obtain the
following clear-cut insight: A complete ban of commissions is, judged from the effect on
consumer welfare, not optimal, as allowing (sufficiently small) positive commissions would
lead to lower rather than higher prices. When such commissions do not bias advice, which
is always the case when firms are symmetric in all relevant aspects, notably costs, such
lower prices then translate into higher welfare, which is achieved by positive and not by zero
commissions. Furthermore, there exists some positive, optimal cap on commissions which
maximizes consumer welfare. This obtains, since, with a complete ban of commissions,
prices are the same as when there is no pass-on, and for small caps on commissions the
increased price elasticity of demand outweighs the (slightly) reduced margin.
This work complements recent studies such as Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a,b), Teh
and Wright (2018), Armstrong and Zhou (2011), de Cornière and Taylor (2019), Hagiu
and Jullien (2011), and Murooka (2014) in analyzing intermediaries’ influence on product
choice.4 Except for Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a,b) and Teh and Wright (2018), typically
4Other studies include Biglaiser (1993) and Lizzeri (1999) where the intermediary provides vertical
information about quality, and Lewis and Sappington (1994), Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001), Johnson
and Myatt (2006), Ganuza and Penalva (2010), Bar-Isaac et al. (2012), and Bolton et al. (2007) where
a seller directly informs a buyer about his match value. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) investigates the
principal-agent conflict between a firm and its sales force.
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consumers are assumed to simply follow the advice of the intermediary. In line with the
latter papers, I allow consumers to rationally decide whether to follow the intermediary’s
advice. My model incorporates both prices and commissions since I am interested in
the interplay between these two choices, which is in contrast to the works of Inderst and
Ottaviani, who consider either only a single strategic firm (c.f. Inderst and Ottaviani
(2012b)) or ex-ante homogeneous consumers (c.f. Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a)) and
thus, do not allow to investigate the effect of competition on prices. In Teh and Wright
(2018) prices and commissions affect the intermediary’s decision, however they consider
search products such that consumers know a product’s match value before a purchase. In
contrast, I consider experience goods such that consumers do not know their match value
until after the purchase.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model which is
analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, I analyze the effect of regulated commissions and
determine the optimal level of regulated commissions from a consumer welfare standard.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Setup I consider a market situation where two firms n = A,B compete for market share
through prices, which are aimed directly at consumers, and through commissions, which
are paid to a single intermediary. I assume that firm A is more cost-efficient than firm B,
i.e. cA ≤ cB.
Valuation, information and advice A consumer’s valuation from purchasing either
product depends on a binary state variable θ = A,B. He derives a higher utility when the
realization of the state variable matches the product. I stipulate that when the product
matches the realized state, utility z+vh is realized and z+vl otherwise, where 0 < vl < vh.
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The parameter z is an idiosyncratic shift in a consumer’s valuation for either product,
which generates a downward sloping demand curve, as I discuss in further detail below. 5
When the consumer chooses the outside option, he derives utility v0, which I normalize to
zero.
Ex-ante, I assume that for each consumer both products are equally likely to be suitable,
so that without advice the expected valuation is z + E[v] = z + (vl + vh) /2. When the
intermediary interacts with a consumer, he obtains private information about which of the
products is more suitable for this consumer. This private information is represented by
a (posterior) belief that product A is more suitable, q = Pr(θ = A). Conditional on q,
a consumer’s expected utility from either product is thus z + E[vA | q] or z + E[vB | q],
where E[vA | q] = vl + q(vh − vl) = vh + q∆v and E[vB | q] = vh − q∆v. A priori, q
is distributed according to the continuous distribution G(q) with density g(q) > 0 over
q ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, I stipulate that this distribution is symmetric, i.e. G(q) = 1−G(1−q).
For a given consumer, the parameter z is randomly drawn from the distribution H(z)
with density h(z) > 0 over some interval [z, z]. It is privately observed by the respective

















5The private valuation z can be the interpreted as the part of a consumer’s match value the intermediary
cannot observe or elicit. Alternatively, the model could be set up such that the consumer’s reservation
value is his private information.
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follows from the symmetry of G(q). Also assume that
E[vA] + z = E[vB] + z =
vl + vh
2
+ z < cn, (4)
so that advice is essential for selling either product. This assumption guarantees that firms
cannot circumvent the intermediary and sell directly to uniformed consumers. To ensure
that either product can be sold with good advice, I further stipulate that
E[vA | q ≥ 1/2] + z = E[vB | q < 1/2] + z > cn. (5)
Consequently, if the intermediary recommends the most suitable product based on the
information in the posterior belief, the expected conditional valuation for some consumers
exceeds costs.
Contracts I restrict contracts to simple price contracts, pn. Assuming the final outcome
v is not verifiable, firms cannot offer contracts contingent on the final outcome such as
warranties or more sophisticated contingent payment schemes. Similarly, firms cannot
condition the intermediary’s compensation scheme on the final outcome. However, they
can condition on whether a product was sold or not, but not whether a competitor’s
product was sold. Therefore, compensation schemes take the form of a fixed wage Fn
and a bonus for a sale fn. Furthermore, I assume the intermediary has zero wealth and
is protected by limited liability, thus fn, Fn ≥ 0. Below, I show that it is in the firms’
interest to set Fn = 0.
Concern for suitability and (regulatory) supervision of advice For the inter-
mediary, who cares directly about received commissions, I stipulate that supervision in-
directly imposes a concern for suitable advice. Even when the final outcome v is not
verifiable, supervisors have, however, the option to directly “test” the intermediary’s ad-
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vice, e.g., through so-called ”mystery shopping” trips, consumer surveys, or consumer
complaints. For simplicity, we stipulate that with probability ϕ a given recommendation
is thus ”tested” by the supervisory authority. Suppose that this rightly predicts a match
with symmetric precision µ > 1/2: When the true state is θ, then the regulator receives
the true signal s = θ with probability µ and the wrong signal s 6= θ with probability
1−µ. Even when this would not constitute proof of an unsuitable recommendation before
court, a supervisor may be in a position to impose penalties on a supposedly misbehaving
intermediary or to interfere with his business in a more discretionary way. We capture
this by a ”loss” L > 0 for the intermediary. In sum, when given some posterior belief q
product A was recommended to the “mystery shopper”, the expected loss to the advisor
is lA(q) = L[(1− q)µ+ q(1− µ)]. When product B was recommended, the expected loss is
lB(q) = L[qµ+ (1− q)(1− µ)]. In light of the following results it is convenient to define
τ = Lϕ(2µ− 1).
Furthermore, I stipulate that the intermediary derives a benefit b > 0 when he recommends
purchasing either product. This captures the notion that the intermediary can, now or
in the future, create sales from different products with the same consumer and effectively
restricts consideration to the choice between A and B.6 The binary nature of suitability
also allows to restrict consideration to a game of advice where the intermediary sends at
most two different messages m, which are denoted m = A,B.7
In the following I assume that consumers hold the naive belief that commissions for
both firms are zero, or that they are unaware of such commissions and their influence
6This assumption does not affect the intermediary’s cut-off rule since only the difference in the benefits
from recommending A or B matters.
7The assumption that intermediaries derive a sufficiently large benefit b > 0 from recommending either
product to a consumer implies that the intermediary never recommends the outside option. Customers
anticipate this behavior and consequently interpret any message the intermediary sends in an informative
equilibrium to be either in favor of product A or in favor of product B. Consequently it is without loss of
generality to reduce the space of messages to m = A,B.
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when making their decision. This implies that consumers expect the advisor not to steer
them to a particular product, i.e. formally, that the cut-off probability q is 1/2. This
follows the analysis in Inderst and Ottaviani (2012c). Naive consumers expect that the
quality of advice is unaffected by the presence and the size of payments from product
providers. There is ample evidence which documents such beliefs, such as Chater et al.
(2010), who show that many consumers are ignorant or unaware of a conflict of interest of
the intermediary. Cain et al. (2005) show that participants in experiments follow advice
more often than they should even when incentives are revealed.8
Timing of moves At t = 1 the two firms n = A,B set prices pn for consumers and con-
tracts (Fn, fn) for the intermediary. At t = 2 the intermediary interacts with a consumer:
He observes private information about the suitability of either product for the respective
consumer and sends a message m to the consumer. At t = 3 the consumer decides whether
to buy either of the products or none. After purchase, the valuation v and all payoffs are
realized at t = 4.
3 Baseline analysis
3.1 Demand derivation
I focus on equilibria where only pure strategies are played and in which advice is informa-
tive. I show that such equilibria always exist. From Assumptions (4) and (5), trade only
takes place in those informative equilibria. In an informative equilibrium, both products
are recommended with positive probability. Further, given a sufficiently large positive
benefit b > 0 which the intermediary derives from recommending either product, I can re-
strict consideration to only two messages from the intermediary, which represent products
8For a more thorough survey of the evidence of naive beliefs and their exploitation see the introduction
of Inderst and Ottaviani (2012c).
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A and B, respectively. I can safely abstract from the case where the interpretation of the
messages is swapped.
Lemma 1 Under (4) a naive consumer either follows the intermediary’s advice or does
not buy at all.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the intermediary recommends product A. Then a naive
consumer expects to receive a conditional expected utility of E[vA | q > 1/2]. If he
would deviate to buy product B he expects to receive conditional expected utility E[vB |
q > 1/2]. Since, G(1/2)E[vB | q ≤ 1/2] + [1−G(1/2)]E[vB | q > 1/2] = E[vB] and
E[vB | q ≤ 1/2] > E[vB], it follows that E[vB | q > 1/2] < E[vB]. Due to Assumption (4),
firm B cannot set a price to induce purchase and cover its costs. The case when product
B is recommended is analogous.
Consumer problem Writing the consumer’s expected valuation for product n when
receiving the message m = n as E[vn | m = n], the consumer will thus follow this
recommendation when
z ≥ z∗n = pn − E[vn | m = n]. (6)
Otherwise, i.e., for z < z∗n, he chooses not to buy.
Intermediary problem When consumers behave in this way, i.e., when they apply
the respective thresholds z∗A and z
∗
B, the intermediary faces the following optimization
problem. If he recommends product n, then given his posterior belief q he expects to
realize the payoff
Fn + Fn′ + [1−H(z
∗
n)] fn − ϕln(q) + b,
where n′ 6= n. Hence, the intermediary prefers to recommend A over B when
[1−H(z∗A)] fA − ϕlA(q) ≥ [1−H(z
∗
B)] fB − ϕlB(q). (7)
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Note that lA(q) is strictly decreasing in q and lB(q) is strictly increasing. Furthermore,
it is obvious that a firm cannot steer the intermediary’s advice through a fixed wage Fn,
which is thus set to zero. After substituting for ln(q), this yields immediately the following
observation.





B)] ≥ τ. (8)





A)] ≥ τ. (9)












so that the intermediary recommends product A when q > q∗ and recommends product B
when q < q∗. (He is indifferent at q = q∗.)
To be brief, we refer to the cases where (8) or (9) apply, respectively, by setting q∗ = 0
or q∗ = 1. Also, when q∗ is interior, we stipulate that the intermediary recommends A
when q = q∗. Given that this is a zero-probability event, this is without loss of generality.
Thus, τ captures the responsiveness of advice to commissions. Note, however, that in our
present analysis it is not the size of fn per se that matters, but the expected commission
payment, taking into account the likelihood with which the consumer follows advice, 1−
H(z∗n). As this depends on the prices pn (cf. expression 6), prices will have a direct
effect on market share, namely through z∗n, and an indirect effect on market share, namely
through q∗. I comment on this in detail below.
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I obtain consumers’ expected valuations (net of z) as follows:














Taken together, I have thus arrived at the following demand for each firm.
Lemma 3 The demand for firm A is given by
DA = Pr [q ≥ q
∗] · Pr [z ≥ z∗A]
= [1−G(q∗)] [1−H(z∗A)]
and that for firm B by
DB = Pr [q < 1− q
∗] · Pr [z ≥ z∗B]
= G(q∗) [1−H(z∗B)] .
3.2 Equilibrium
Recall that consumers purchase after a recommendation when their private valuation ex-
ceeds a certain threshold and that the intermediary, anticipating this behavior, applies a
cut-off rule when advising according to Lemma 2. Further, since consumers hold naive be-
liefs, they do not internalize the effect of higher commissions or prices on the intermediary’s




∗)] [1−H(z∗A)] (pA − fA − cA) (12)




∗) [1−H(z∗B)] (pB − fB − cB). (13)
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Before I consider the equilibrium behavior of firms, I first analyze a firm’s optimal strategy
for given choices of the competing firm. When the solution to the maximization problem












(pn − fn − cn)−Dn = 0,






+ fn + cn (14)
which is familiar from oligopoly pricing. Therefore, for given choices by its competitor, the
optimal price consists of the marginal costs necessary to make each sale fn + cn and the
firm’s markup resulting from the trade-off between a higher demand and a higher margin.
Next, consider the optimality condition for commissions. Since the profit function is the







To provide addtional intuition, suppose that for some choice of (pn, fn) demand responds
more strongly to an increase in commission than to an increase in price. Then, the firm
could increase commission and price by the same amount. This would leave the firm’s
margin pn−fn− cn unchanged, but by assumption of the considered cases it would overall
increase demand for firm n’s product since demand expands more due to the increase in
commission than it decreases due to the price increase. Plugging the partial derivatives of
9See section A of the Appendix for the derivation of the partial derivatives.
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∗) is the share of consumers the intermediary steers to firm n, i.e. SA(q
∗) =
1 − G(q∗) and SB(q






Note that z∗n only depends on p
∗
n and not on any other strategic variable. Furthermore, in
the optimum firm n’s margin is
p∗n − f
∗







Lemma 4 When the solution to the firm’s maximization problem is interior, firm n op-
timally sets commissions and prices according to (16) and (17). The optimal commission
depends on the optimal price as well as the competitor’s choices (captured through q∗) and
ceterus paribus, decreases with the concern for good advice τ . The optimal price neither
depends on commissions nor the competitor’s choices, and as such (higher) commissions
are not passed on to consumers.
Hence, even though the optimal margin (18) depends on optimal commissions f ∗n and
consequently on the competitor’s choices, the optimal price p∗n does not.
Even though the price also affects advice and interacts with commissions in this way, at
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the optimum (interior) choice, it is as if the firm sets its price like a monopolist, ignoring its
commission. Next, looking at the optimal commissions, we can make multiple observations.
When the intermediary has a higher concern for suitability (large τ), commissions are
lower. Further, the second term in (16) can be rewritten as Sn(q
∗)/ (∂Sn(q
∗)/∂fn) and thus
interpreted as the tradeoff between a higher share of consumers steered to the firm and
higher marginal costs in the form of a higher commission. Next, I turn to the equilibrium.
Since, I am interested in the effect of regulated commissions on prices, I first find sufficient
conditions such that each firm has an incentive to set positive commissions in the absence
of such regulation. From (16) we know that when the intermediary is too concerned
about suitability, then firms would like to set zero commissions. If, on the other hand,
the concern for suitability is below some upper bound, then it is optimal for firms to set
positive commissions.
Lemma 5 If the intermediary’s concern for good advice, τ , is sufficiently small, then
commissions are strictly positive in equilibrium, i.e. if τ < τ for some τ > 0, then f ∗ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider the equilibrium with commissions at f ∗A = f
∗
B = 0.
Then first consider the commission paid by firm A. The derivative of firm A’s profit with
respect to commissions evaluated at f ∗A = f
∗




























− [1−G(1/2)] [1−H(z∗A)] .
Note here that, at f ∗A = 0, z
∗
A does not depend on τ (as p
∗
A does not depend on τ). A




















= τA > τ.
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Thus, when the intermediary’s concern for good advice is smaller than τA, firm A can
profitably deviate and sets strictly positive commissions. A similar reasoning applies to





= τB > τ.
Since the optimal price increases in marginal costs, z∗n increases, and consequently the
upper bound for the concern for suitability is higher for the more cost-efficient firm. Thus,
with cA ≤ cB, τA ≥ τB. I define the minimum of these upper bounds as τ ≡ min {τA, τB}.
Consequently, when τ < τ both firms set positive commissions in equilibrium.
Given that commissions will be strictly positive in equilibrium when τ < τ , I can deter-
mine equilibrium prices and commissions from the already obtained first-order conditions.
Proposition 1 When the difference in cost-efficiencies is not too large, and the concern
for good advice τ is sufficiently small (τ < τ), then there is a unique equilibrium in pure















F ∗n = 0,















Proof of Proposition 1. The existence of this equilibrium follows immediately from




determined by the first-order conditions with respect to price and commissions, neither
firm has an incentive to deviate. Since consumers hold the naive belief that commissions
are zero, and thus that advice is objective, the LHS of (19) is constant.Further, the RHS
is decreasing in q∗ and switches signs at q∗ = 1/2. Hence, when the difference in cost-
efficiencies is not too large, i.e. the LHS is not too large or too small, then by continuity
there exists a q∗ which solves (19). Uniqueness, follows from the decreasing inverse hazard
rates and from the monotonicity of (19) with respect to q∗.
When firms are symmetric with respect to costs, they set the same prices and commissions
in equilibrium, and consequently the optimal cut-off rule for the intermediary is q∗ = 1/2.
On other hand with asymmetric firms when firm A is more cost-efficient, i.e. cA < cB,
then the optimal cut-off is q∗ < 1/2. Thus, the intermediary steers more consumers to
firm A than to firm B. Additionally, firm A’s price is lower, and thus, its overall market
share is higher than the market share of firm B.
Next, I analyze regulation where my interest lies particularly on prices and welfare.
For this analysis, I stipulate cA = cB. Then, from above I conclude that regulating τ has
no impact. However, as I explore next, imposing a cap on commissions does.
4 Capping commissions
In this section I analyze the effect of regulated commissions on prices. From Proposition 1
and Lemma 5 I know that unregulated commissions are strictly positive, thus regulation
can potentially take place as a cap on commissions f . The effects of regulating commis-
sions are twofold. First, regulating commissions can affect the quality of advice directly.
However, here I assume symmetry in costs, i.e. cA = cB, which allows me to abstract from
this distortive effect of commissions, and τ < τ which rules out the case where firms do
not have an incentive to set commissions at all. Rather, I focus on the second effect of
regulating commissions which is an effect on profits and prices and thereby deadweight
17






(pn − fn − cn) +Dn = 0.
Regulation of commissions has an immediate effect through the margin pn − fn − cn and
a more ambiguous effect through ∂Dn/∂pn. When commissions are capped and the cap
binds, then the equilibrium is pinned down by the intermediary’s optimal cut-off and the
firms’ first-order conditions with respect to price. Due to symmetry, the optimal cut-off is
at q∗ = 1/2 regardless of the cap on commissions, or commissions at all, since firms have
the same incentives to set prices and commissions. Thus, under symmetry and a binding


















[1−H(z∗)] = 0, (20)
where I have dropped the firm-specific subscripts. I can now evaluate the effect of an
increase or decrease of the cap on commissions on equilibrium prices through the implicit
derivative of (20), dp∗/df .
































































Even though the effect is thus generally ambiguous, I can investigate the extreme case of
a complete ban on commissions, i.e. f = 0. For this I obtain clear-cut results.
Lemma 6 Starting from a full ban of commissions, f = 0, allowing (at least marginally
small) positive commissions leads to lower prices.































It is immediate that the denominator is always positive due to the increasing hazard rate.













Plugging in the optimal price given by the equilibrium condition (20) for f = 0, p∗ =
1−H(z∗)
h(z∗)





This threshold value of the concern for good advice of the intermediary is the same as in
Lemma 5 which guarantees positive commissions in the unregulated equilibrium. Thus,
when commissions are strictly positive in the unregulated equilibrium, banning commis-
sions entirely is not optimal since a small increase on the cap would reduce prices.
In addition, I obtain the following result.
Lemma 7 When commissions are banned completely, the same prices obtain as if firms
would have chosen to set commissions optimally.
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It is apparent that this expression is identical to the optimal price with unregulated com-
missions, 17, when firms are symmetric.
Taken together, these result are at first surprising. As noted above, one immediate
effect of higher commissions is that this reduces firms’ margins, similarly to an increase in
costs, which obviously tends to increase prices. Put differently, even when there is no bias
of advice, given symmetry in this model, regulation could be justified by the argument that
higher commissions are ultimately passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
This would not only directly reduce consumer surplus, but also welfare. The latter follows
from the fact that in this model, with downward sloping demand, there is a standard
deadweight loss associated with higher prices (and thus higher cut-off values z∗A and z
∗
B).
But this argument would ignore a second effect, which, as I have shown, can be so strong
as to outweigh the more intuitive, direct effect of lower margins on prices. When firm
B pays a positive commission and now firm A raises its price, the advisor becomes more
inclined to steer recommendations to firm B, as the higher price of firm A risks making no
sale at all (and thus not earning a commission as well). In other words, from the product
providers’ perspective demand becomes more elastic with respect to their own price if
there are positive commissions. This reduces firms’ incentives to increase the price.
Starting from an absolute ban of commissions, I showed that the effect of such a more
elastic demand is so strong that it outweighs the first effect, so that prices are lower when
commissions are (marginally) positive. This observation coupled with Lemma 7 leads to
my key result.
Proposition 2 There exists a socially-optimal, strictly positive cap on commissions f ∗ >
20
f > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Trivially follows from Lemmas 6 and 7.
Example with a uniform distribution. Consider an example where the private valu-
ation z follows a uniform distribution, i.e. z ∼ U [0, 1], and the probability that product A
is more suitable q also follows a uniform distribution q ∼ U [0, 1]. Furthermore, I assume
parameter values such that Assumptions 4 and 5 are satisfied, and that commissions in the
unregulated symmetric equilibrium are positive.10 Figure 4 shows the effect of different
binding caps on commissions on the equilibrium price for different values of the concern
for good advice τ . The endpoint to the right of each graph signifies the equilibrium price
which obtains when the cap on commissions is precisely at the value of commissions in
the unregulated equilibrium. I can make the following observations. First, when τ is
smaller, the equilibrium commissions in the unregulated equilibrium are indeed higher.
As I have already observed, when τ is smaller, the intermediary’s concern for good ad-
vice is smaller and therefore he is more sensitive to commissions. In the uniform case an
increase in the cap on commissions on prices is negative until a certain level is reached
,and leads to an increase in prices afterwards. It is also apparent that the negative ef-
fect is largest when commissions are banned completely. This makes sense since when
commissions are banned, the intermediary’s optimal cut-off is not affected by the firms’
prices and thus the price elasticity of demand is low. When the cap on commissions is
marginally lifted, the intermediary’s decision becomes elastic with respect to price and thus
firms also start to compete for the intermediary’s recommendation through price. Finally,
the figure suggests that the optimal cap on commissions from a consumer welfare stan-
dard, f , the location of the minimum of the graphs, increases when τ is higher. Thus, for a
small τ the optimal cap is relatively low while for a high τ the optimal commission is high.
10For more details regarding the parameters and derivations of the equilibrium prices and commissions
under the distributional assumptions see Section B of the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium price with a binding cap on commissions. This figure depicts
the equilibrium price p∗ conditional on the cap on commissions f for different values of the
concern for good advice τ where a higher τ indicates a higher concern for good advice. I
assume the following parameters: to generate this figure: c = 7/4, vh = 3/4, and vl = 1/4.
Furthermore, I assume that the private valuation z as well as the probability that product
A is more suitable q are uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes advice when the intermediary and product providers are faced with a
downward sloping demand. In a first step of the analysis, I derive the optimal unregulated
levels of commission, and prices. Product prices affect demand through two channels.
First, there is an obvious direct impact of higher prices on demand. Second, prices also
affect advisors’ recommendations even when the advisor does not care directly about the
level of prices (and thus consumer surplus). Still, prices affect recommendations as an
advisor who recommends a more expensive product risks ending up with no sale at all.
This insight proves key for the analysis as through this channel higher commissions make
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demand more price elastic.
I use this framework to analyze the impact of a cap on commissions on welfare. For this
I choose a symmetric setting, which allows to abstract from biased advice. Consequently,
commissions affect consumer welfare and total welfare only through the price level. I
show that a general ban is not welfare optimal as, in contrast to immediate intuition,
higher commmissions do not necessarily lead to higher consumer prices. Starting from
a general ban, allowing (marginally) higher commissions indeed leads to lower prices as
positive commissions make intermediaries wary to recommend more expensive products to
consumers, risking no sale at all.
Future work could consider different instruments of regulation such as the disclosure
of commissions, which typically has a dampening effect on commissions, notably when
it makes previously naive consumers aware of commissions. A further avenue for future
research is finally to embed this model with a single advisor into a larger setting with
potentially competing advisors.
A First-order conditions












































































(pA − fA − cA)















(pB − fB − cB)







(pA − fA − cA)− [1−G(q







(pB − fB − cB)−G(q
∗) [1−H(z∗B)] = 0. (A.4)
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B Example with a uniform distribution
I consider an example where both the private valuation z and the probability that product
A is more suitable q follow a uniform distribution ,i.e. z ∼ U [0, 1] and q ∼ U [0, 1]. Under
these distributional assumptions, when the concern for good advice is sufficiently small,
the symmetric unregulated equilibrium is described by
p∗A = 1− z
∗
A + cA, (B.1)
p∗B = 1− z
∗
B + cB, (B.2)
















with z∗A = p
∗




A − E[vA(q) | q > 1/2]. Solving for p
∗
n and
plugging back into f ∗n yields
p∗A =























The critical value for the concern for good advice, τ , follows from Lemma 5 and the
distributional assumptions as
















In order to produce the graph, I assume the following parameter values: vh = 3/4, vl = 1/4
and c = 7/4. With these parameter values, Assumptions 4 and 5 are satisfied as I have
E[vA] + z = E[vB] + z = 1/2 + 1 < 7/4, (B.11)
and
E[vA(q) | q > 1/2] + z = E[vB(q) | q ≤ 1/2] + z = 7/4 + 1 > 7/4. (B.12)
Thus, the intermediary is necessary to make trade possible. Plugging the parameters back
into optimal prices, I have p∗n = 9/4, commissions are f
∗
n = 1/2− 2τ and the critical value
for the concern for good advice is given by τ = 1/4. With the distributional assumptions































The figure plots the solution of this implicit equation as a function of the cap on commis-
sions for different values of τ .
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